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In the :Jiatter of the Estate of 
JA"JIES JOH~ LATSIS (sometimes Case No. 7954 
known as "Latses"), 
Deceased. 
PETITION OF RESPONDENT 
UTAH SAVINGS & TRUST COMPANY 
FOR REHEARING AND FOR CLARIFICATION 
This petition by this Respondent, who is now charged 
to proceed as administrator by the opinion of the Court 
herein, will present serious errors in the opinion herein, 
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as \Vell as suggestions for assistance of the trial Court, 
and in the further administration, if that would still be 
necessary. 
To now take up the administration which \Yas dis-
continued, if not concluded, by what the opinion desig-
nates ''the decree of distribution and order discharging 
the administrator," entered Octiber 9, 1945, will certainly 
present difficulties, and some of these may be avoided 
by reexamination of the opinion, or by clarification as 
suggested herein. 
We accept our share of responsibility for some of 
the errors we now complain of, because we attempted to 
follow the order of appellants' brief and therefore did 
not present our points effectively, or in the order of their 
importance. We thought at the time this way might be 
more convenient to the Court. 
We did, however, attempt, as did the trial Court, to 
prevent some of the confusion and difficulty now in-
volved here by trying to have the complainants' case pre-
sented by complaint in equity, with proper parties, and 
with the issues defined, as the Rules require. 
Our points in support hereof are now presented in 
order with a separate supporting memo following each 
point, as follows: 
I. 
It seems to be an error of importance here that 
this Court did not decide the question raised by our 
motion to dismiss (R. 153) and decided by the trial 
Court. The trial Court ruled ( R. 205) that the 
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attempted procedure by petition was not proper 
under the Rules of Civil Procedure, and certain ex-
press statutes, and the decisions of this Court. The 
only matter presented to this Oourt for decision 
therefore was whether this was the proper way to 
proceed. That question is not discussed or decided in 
the opinion. 
MEMO SUPPORTING I. 
As a n1atter of procedure not only may matters of 
"mistakes in settlement" after discharge be presented 
only "by an action in equity" (75-14-23); and, Rule 60-b 
says "any relief fron1 a judgment" after three months 
''shall be * * * by an independent action.'' And this rule 
allows the Court to ''entertain such a:ction * * * to relieve 
a party from a judgment * * * for fraud upon the Court,'' 
and then also of course (75-1-7) as to real property where 
administrator is appointed, as here, "no objection to 
any subsequent order or decree * * * can be taken * * * 
on account of any * * * defect or irregularity * * * other 
than on direct application * * * at any ,time before dis-
tribution, or on appeal." Appellants' petition is an "ob-
jection" based on a "defect," if it is anything. 
But even more vital is the fact that this opinion 
is ineffective because it can not possibly restore the 
former property of the estate to the custody of the 
administrators or the trial Court for further probate. 
This of course applies to the personal property, and to 
money paid out by order of Court to petitioners' attorney 
representative or others, but particularly applies to the 
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nine parcels of real estate (R. 129) which immediately 
passed into private hands more than eight years ago. 
In fact, appellants, before this appeal, filed an 
action in the Third District Court by complaint, a certi-
fied eopy of which we understand has been .presented 
to this Court, with William Latsis and Sigmund Helwing, 
Administrator, et al, as plaintiffs, and 32 defendants, in 
which it is alleged that the plaintiffs and all these de-
fendants claim or assert some right or interest in some 
portions of these former estate properties. 
Furthermore, the procedure here, by petitions, which 
met the trial Court's objection, can not and does not seek 
to divest any owner or claimant of any right. If such 
challenge could be made by petition, it is not made as 
against anyone, not even the widow. She and this Re-
spondent are here, as indicated by the Court's opinion, 
only by complaint of their conduct as administrators. 
It must be evident therefore that this opinion can 
not have any effect to restore the status existing when 
the estate was closed. Isn't this a futile and fruitless, if 
not in fact an unauthorized, procedure? 
The possibility of actions by administrators to re-
possess some or all of the properties may not be entirely 
precluded, but such suits could be numerous • and long 
drawn out, and, because of factual situations as referred 
to under the next point, could fail. According to a theory 
advanced by appellants here, eac;h of these foreign heirs 
is entitled to claim a small fractional interest in eaeh 
piece of real property amounting to the proportion which 
his claim bears to the total of all other interests. 'Vhilr 
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this could seiTe to con1plicate things even more here, it 
doesn't seem to be sound or to have been adopted by 
the Court. ~\s we pointed out in our brief (p. 35), any 
percentage interest of any one appellant is very small 
here, and no such interest would haYe been of any con-
ceivable benefit. 
It is true also that we have other partition statutes 
and which, though not as comprehensive or as fittingly 
applicable here as 75-14-25-the one used by the trial 
Court-nevertheless would permit of sale and which (see 
73-12-16) would permit the \\~hole property to be assigned 
by the Court to the widow if she would accept and pay 
the other parties their just proportion of the value, 
or (see 75-12-17) the property may be set off by referees 
to any of the parties who will accept it upon similar pay-
ment being made to the others. Admittedly, some of the 
complications may in this way be aided if not eliminated. 
It is substantially the same thing that the Court and the 
appellants' attorney representative, did back in 1945. 
II. 
Another matter of serious irregularity, con-
fusion, and injustice is that this Cour.t by its opinion 
has decided the whole case before the evidence is 
in. This case is on appeal from the order granting 
our motion to dismiss. The defending parties, and all 
parties interested in the properties involved, have 
not been permitted to plead to .the facts presented by 
the appellants' petitions and briefs, or be heard on 
the facts pleaded by appellants, or facts to be pleaded 
in defense of the probate proceedings heretofore 
taken. 
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MEMO SUPPORTING II. 
The administrators are now treated as defendants in 
the opinion, but denied opportunity to defend their 
administration. Derogatory allegations in the petitions 
may be treated as true for the purpose of our motion 
to dismiss, but may not be so treated for the purpose of 
final determination of, or to prejudice any future de-
terminations that may be involved. 
More seriously, some misstatements of fact found 
in appellants' brief are erroneously adopted by the Court 
in the opinion, and there are several assumptions of 
material facts not alleged, and, of course, not proved. So 
that by this summary disposition of this case by this high 
Court parties interested in the properties and probate 
of this estate cannot hereafter ever be expected success-
fully to contradict these misstatements and erroneous 
assumptions as recited in the opinion, or to ·establish the 
0ontrary either in the Court below or in this Court on 
· future appeals. 
As a separate nwtter of future procedure, should 
not we and shmtld not the trial Court know now whether 
this Court, by its order to complete "the probate by 
further proceedings," intends us to proceed as if all these 
things are settled and foreclosed and as if the original 
funds and properties are still in the hands of the admini-
strators and the Court, and how this can possibly be 
done? 
As illustrating our references to conclusions in the 
opinion from disputed facts, it is asserted therein that 
the partition and distribution by the lower Court resulted 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
frmn litigation oyer whether certain properties of the 
Yalue of about $1:2,000.00 belonged to the estate or to the 
widow. The opinion (p. 3) speaks of "inconvenience and 
prejudice" as if such had happened to the appellants 
from the settlement and distribution here, anJ speaks 
of this as coming "from a dispute as to the amount of 
property which should be included in the estate.'' 
There are a number of factual things like this, which 
not only should not be determined without proper hear-
ing, but they gaYe an entirely wrong impression of the 
Probate Court's conduct of this orderly probate proceed-
ing, and they have plainly been allowed to influence the 
opinion here. These things not only have not been heard, 
but they are contrary to what the record now shows 
as to the reason or basis for this settlement. 
First, the petition for the partition and distribution 
(R. 86) was filed before the opinion here says that litiga-
tion was abandoned by the widow. Such abandonment, if 
any there was, could only have the effect of admitting 
that the property in question did belong to the estate, 
and, as a matter of fact, the proceeding and order were 
had on that basis, and, therefore, appellants were not 
at all prejudiced. The petition by their attorney repre-
sentative and others, said that they were in need and 
desired to have their portion of the estate and further 
that, "the parties hereto have estimated as best they 
can from the appraisals and other information the value 
of Raid estate and of the interest of said four heirs and 
havr determined the value of their interest at approxi-
mate}~' $10,000.00. '' This is fully supported by the evi-
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dence on the hearing (R. 243). 
The Prob~te Court directly raised the question (R. 
250) as to whether the heirs were making a compromise 
stipulation or whether the proposed partition was to be 
based upon determination of values, then: 
''THE COURT: The point that I make is if 
it amounted to considerably more than ten thou-
sand dollars and this \:vas just merely a com-
promise settlement in order to get it quicker-
'' MR. COTRO-MANES: No, no. 
''THE COURT: Or avoid litigation, or some-
thing of that nature, that is ·one thing, but if thi~ 
is an approximation as nearly as you can reach, of 
·what they would receive upon final distribution-
''MR. MULLINER: That is right. 
''MR. COTRO-MANES: That will be about 
it, your honor. I will state to the court further 
if it were not for certain litigation that we had, 
probably we would never have got any settlement 
at all. We might have eventually received some 
money.'' 
Then (R. 252) : 
''MR. COTRO-MANES: So that $12,000 we 
are not concerned with that now. 
"THE COURT: The only matter which is 
before me is the question of approving thi~ 
$10,000 in settlement of their distributive share. 
''MR. COTRO-M:ANES: That is right. 
"THE COURT: You represent to me that 
that is approximately, as nearl)' a~ you can com-
pute it~ 
"M~. COTRO-MANES: T·hat i~ right, and in 
my judgment it is for the he~t interests of thP~P 
heirs.'' 
So that this if' it. This $10,000.00 \\'a~ '·in settlement 
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of their distributiYe share," and the ,order (R. 95) then 
recites that the an1ount of the agreed settlement ''is a 
reasonable ainount to be expected fron1 the estate of the 
heirs thereof other than Virginia Latsis, and considering 
the properties of the decedent * * * . '' 
And then the administrators -
''are authorized and directed to pay and dis-
tribute" the said amount ratably to the heirs 
named (R. 96) such "distribution" to be made 
through the Hellenic Bank or American Express, 
''whichever source is selected by the above men-
tioned attorney for the heirs, and that the issu-
ance and delivery of checks to such source shall 
relieve administrators herein from further re-
sponsibility therefor.'' 
Thus the Court not only acted pursuant to the language 
of the statute, but uses the language of the statue as to 
it being a "distribution." 
We can't, of course, anticipate all the facts that may 
be properly raised if this case were tried ,on the petitions 
and responsive pleadings, but we know from connection 
with it that many factual matters affecting the rights of 
parties will be foreclosed or prejudiced by this premature 
adjudication. The false allegations by appellants of 
their lack of knowledge of the probate proceedings here, 
and facts of their O\Vn laches and acquiescence in this 
proceeding with actual as well as constructive knowledge, 
as well as all the facts affecting their rights to have an 
adverse determination of titles to real estate which has 
been held and occupied adversely for nearly nine years 
now, should all be allowed to be pleaded and to be fairly 
tried. 
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Other factual matters assumed without proof appear 
under Point V infra. 
III. 
The Court has seriously erred in refusing to 
apply the plain language of 75-14-25, U.C.A., and by 
mistaken comparison with other and different 
statutes, and different proceedings in other jurisdic-
tions, has destroyed its further use, or any future 
dependence on this statute in cases like this, and has 
left all titles dependent on its use in doubt, even 
though its validity or proper application was here in 
no way presented in issue herein. 
MEMO SUPPORTING III. 
The appointment or authority of their attorney 
representative under this statute is not questioned here, 
but is affirmatively alleged by appellants (R. 84) who, in 
fact, recognize throughout that the attorney represented 
these heirs as therein provided, and had presented the 
petition and evidence upon which the settlement and 
distribution 'vas determined and n1ade; and they also 
allege that the attorney assumed the duty of distribution 
of the fund as ordered, and undertook this (R. 190). 
No jssue as to limitation of his powers or tlt<' 
power of the Court as now decided, was ever intimated in 
a pleading, but was suggested only in the reply brief 
of appellants filed August 23, 1953, after the case had been 
briefed and set for argument, and nine and one-half 
years after the appointment. Nothing of this wa~ hdon• 
the trial Court on it:-; ruling presented to this Court for 
review; nor here presented eitlwr in the Point~ relie1l 
10 
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upon as filPll, or ns set forth in appellants' brief. 
Furthermore, the appellants misled the Court by 
erroneonsl:- treating the proceedings taken pursuant to 
the authority giYen the Court and the attorney repre-
sentatiYe by the express language of the statute itself, 
as "stipulating away appellants' rights" or stipulating 
to ''preclude them'' frmn claiming their share of the 
estate, and by charging their attorney as having 
"waived" their rights. 
So the Court (p. 3) cites and quotes some such 
language as this from a California case (66 Pac. 30). We 
very respectfully point out, that this case involved abso-
lutely nothing that is in our case here, and nothing that 
is in our statute, and there is nothing to indicate that 
California has a statute involving the applicable language 
in our statute, and certainly no" similar statute" is cited 
or indicated. The dicta quoted in the opinion here was 
used in connection with the lower Court's attempt to pay 
out of protestants' share of an estate, attorney's fees 
to the Court appointed attorney for services while the 
protestants were, in fact, being represented by attorneys 
employed by themselves, after the period of appointment 
of the former attorney had expired. There is not the re-
motest similarity in the applicable law or facts. 
This seems, therefore, to be not only a wholly gratui-
tious opinion on this, but also a terrifically drastic ·off-
hand way to destroy a State statute which obviously is 
important because of the unusual number of immigrant 
people here who natura.Ily have foreign heirs. 
The orderly procedure taken under this statute was 
11 
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not a "stipulation" or a "waiver" of anything. True, 
there was an agreement as to what would constitute a 
fair partition and distribution, and this was recited in 
a petition. It was nnt a matter in which the admini-
strators, as such, were directly interested. The pro-
cedure, however, washy (1) petition as it had to be, and 
then (2) by complete hearing (R. 243-260), the c'omplete 
goo'd faith of which has not been and, if fairly examined, 
we are sure will not he questioned, and then (3) a par-
tition and distribution were approved and ordered by 
the Court. How can 75-14-25 or the authority therein 
"for * * * settlements, partitions, and distributions" of 
estates and provisions that the attorney is by his appoint-
ment "thereby charged to represent" the persons for 
whom he is appointed "in all proceedings subsequent 
to appointment," ever be used or carried out except 
exactly as it was done here, by petibon, hearing, and 
order of settlement partition and distribution. No right 
was stipulated away because there were no rights beyond 
what the Court, having complete jurisdiction, regularly 
determined was the value of the interests in the estate, 
then partitioned and distributed. 
We wish to add that, contrary to the language of 
the California Court quoted in that situation, it seems 
certain that our District Court under our statute in thi~ 
matter of partition and distribution may do more with 
the aid of the attorney representative properly appointed 
thereunder by wa~r of "partition" and "distribution" 
than it might do without the use of this statute and 
12 
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this appoinhnent, just as the Court with the aid of 
referees under our other partition statutes (75-12-12, 
16, 17) may make such partitions and distributions by 
payn1ents in cash. The legislative authority therefor is 
the same. 
And here he does not, as there stated, receive "his 
authority only from the Court." He receives it and so 
does the Court under our statutes from the Legislature, 
and certainly succession is all a "matter of legislative 
control." And here he obviously is more than a mere 
attorney-at-law. He is a statutory representative, with 
all the authority the statute clothes him and the Court 
with, in these matters. 
(See: State v. Dist. Court, 85 P. 1022.) 
IV. 
The Court has done an unprecedented thing here 
by holding, on its own motion, that a decree, which 
by its own terms makes final distribution and dis-
charge, is not :a final decree, and that such, after more 
than six years, may be collaterally attacked by a 
petition in probate, contrary to the Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the decisions of this Court as well 
as to the Statutes of Utah, as to time and grounds 
for such attack. 
MEMO SUPPORTING IV. 
This decree can not be treated as void before it 
is attacked at all, and is therefore plainly not subject 
13 
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to collateral attack, or to be treated as a nullity hy the 
Court, in violation of its rules and decisions, as well as 
the Statutes of the State. 
And again, we cannot find that this issue is any-
where alleged in the petitions which are now being 
treated as complaints here. These petitions seem to 
recognize that the distribution had been made, and 
attempt to charge us with fraud or misfeasance in having 
n1ade it (R. '156, 172). Certainly, the validity orf the 
Decree was not a'n issue before the trial Court or in 
the order sustaining our rnotion (R. 153, 205) which 
order alone was appealed fro-m. 
Should it not be required that before an issue of 
this kind and importance can be decided by the Supreme 
Court that it must have been properly presented to the 
parties, or at least to the Court whose decision is up for 
review~ This seems especially important here because 
certainly other persons depen'ding ·on this decree for 
title to properties will be prejudiced by the opinion 
on this, even if it could not actua'lly bind them in future 
appeals. 
\V e present the point to suggest that the decision 
of this matter at all was inappropriate under the eir-
cumstances and for such interpretation and 'future gui-
dance as the Court may co-nsider helpful in this probate 
proceeding. \Ve believe it is will taken, but do not aq.?;llP 
it further because the very next point, and a most im-
portant one, hears upon this ahw. 
1-t 
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v. 
The plainly erroneous conclusion that this final 
"decree of distribution and order of discharge" in 
fact "was conditional" is astoundingly based entirely 
on utterly false statements as to what the decree 
itself says, as well as on erroneous statements as to 
matters already of record here. 
ME).IO SUPPORTING V. 
\V e use the term "false" advisedly and correctly, 
but knowing, of course, that the Court was misled by 
appellants and did not know this to he so. Again on 
this point, we have the fact that this vital matter of 
decision was not presented in issue in the trial Court 
below by the petitions, or was it in issue on our motion 
or the Court's order appealed from. 
Passing this, we will call attention directly to the 
following numbered basic misstatements in the opinion 
itself: 
Erorr 1 (p. 3): 
"***even if the stipulation had been binding it 
expressly provided that approval of the settlement by 
the court was subject to the heirs accepting payment, 
executing the necessary receipts, assigning their interest, 
and releasing the estate 'from liability." 
(Note (R. 87) that it did not expressly or otherwise 
say this, and no party to this petition attempted to, or 
could, make the court's order "subject" to anything, 
and it wasn't.) 
Error 2 (p. 4): 
15 
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"***that the stipulation and the order confinning 
it expressly provided that the heirs are to be bound 
only if they accept payment, execute the necessary 
receipts, assign their interest and release the estate 
from liability, ***" 
(Note, that this order neither "expressly" or other-
wise says anything about this.) 
Error 3 (p. 4) : 
''***the decree of distribution approves and inco-r-
porates the stipulation,***" 
(Note that the decree of distribution nowhere men-
tions the stipulation, let alone approving or incorporating 
it, and neither directly or indirectly refers to its con-
tents.) 
Error4 (p. 3): 
This one refers to the order of Feb. 27, and the 
same matters mentioned in Errors 1 and 2, and says: 
"This must have been ordered by the court advisedly 
and for the purpose of safeguarding the rights of these 
foreign heirs." 
(Note, that the Court never ordered this at all, or 
ever used the expression quoted in Error 1 above (R. 
95-97), or any language of like import.) 
Error 5 (p. 2) : 
This one is doubly important because the above 
mentioned errors are based upon it. It purports to 
quote, but misstates the language and meaning of a 
paragraph of the final Decree, and we capitalize a 
statement inserted into the decree a~ follows: 
16 
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''The settlement, payments and distribution, 
and provision for distribution, made pursuant to 
the order herein of February 27, 1945 [THE 
PETITIO~ .A~D STIPULATION FILED ON 
FEBRUARY 13, 1945, HEREINABOVE SET 
FORTH] is approved and allowed.'' 
Xow, compare the actual language of the Decree, with-
out inserts or changes, as follows: 
''The settlen1ent, payments and distribution, 
and provision for distribution, made pursuant to 
the order herein of February 27, 1945 and as here-
inabove set forth, is approved and allowed.'' 
(Note, again, that the Decree neither here (R. 128) 
nor anywhere, mentions the "petition" or the "stipu-
lation" and that the words "hereinabo·ve set forth" do 
not refer at all to the stipulation or even the order, but 
do refer to the provisions "above set forth" in the D·ecree 
f.or the "payment and distribution" of the $10,000.00. 
Also, that what is "approved and allowe'd" is not the 
stipulation or the order but the prior provisions in the 
Decree as to provisions there made for funds to com-
plete payment of the balance of the $10,000.00.) 
A brief reference to the documents mentioned by 
the Court will more fully establish the· above errors : 
Petition of 2-13-45: 
This is referred to by the Court as a "stipulation," 
and is also more appropriately called a petition (R. 86). 
It is signed by all the heirs, including the two who were 
here, by themselves, and the three foreign heirs, by 
their attorney representative, and also by the two admini-
strators, as such, and by their attorneys. 
17 
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The quote'd portions of the petition are correct. But 
these things are from the petition; they are not in the 
order, and the word "only" as used near the end of the 
opinion is added, it doesn't appear even in the petition. 
And none of this that is quoted in the opinion appears in 
any court order, as is erroneously asserted in the last 
paragraph of the opinion. 
All that is said even in the petition on this is that 
"it has been agreed***subject to the approval of the 
Court. That the said payment and settlement shall 
become binding and conclusive as to each***upon the 
acceptarnce of his portion of the said fund and the exe-
cution of the necessary instruments to receipt therefor 
and to assign his said interest and release the said 
estate." This is a statement that the parties were in 
agreement that two things would make the settlement 
binding-(1) "acceptance" of the nwney, and (2) the 
"execution of the necessary instruments." And this is 
a correct statement of what would make a settlement 
binding, regardless of whether it had been so recited or 
not, and it certainly doesn't say that the parties who 
n1ade the stipulation may not themselves change the 
conditions of delivery or acceptance, or that the court 
may not approve such changed conditions or make other 
provisions for distribution, as it did. In· fad the petition 
(R. 87) petitioned, "That the court***shall dirert tlw 
manner of disbursement of the said fund." 
A petition means, and i~, onl~' a presentation to 
the Court of something for the ( ~ourt's <·onHideration. 
Plainly, everybody connected with it then believed thn t 
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the $10,000.00 distribution was wanted by the heirs who 
were and would be eager to get the money, and would 
naturally be expected to receipt for it. Their attorney 
presented pages of proof of this ( R. 243-260) to the 
Court. EYerybody was convinced of it, although it was 
intimated that war and revolution conditions could delay 
delivery. 
In the statement quoted above in "Error 1," how-
ever, the opinion goes completely off the track. The 
petition doesn't say anything like this quote from the 
opinion, and it certainly would have he·en an imperti-
nence for the parties to have said "that approval***by 
the court was subject" to something they might try to 
impose. This is a complete reversal of fact and condi-
tion. The petition, exactly to the contrary, stated that 
what was being proposed was "subject to the approval 
of the***court." 
So this stipulation or petition became an agreement, 
if at all, only if or to the extent approved by the Court. 
The Court was also petitioned that "such other orders 
and conditions be made as to the Court shall seem 
necessary or appropriate," so that even as to the petition 
alone the opinion seems to have entirely misconstrued 
its purport, character and its effect. 
We are constrained to wonder why this Court goes 
into such uncertain matters of interpretation at all, and 
particularly why it adopts the strajned interpretations 
of appellant's attorneys who were and apparently still 
are, utter strangers to all the proceedings referred to. 
Why do we not follow the universal rule that requires 
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and permits pleadings by the parties of their positions 
on these things, and proof of the surrounding circum-
stances, of the information that all parties possessed, 
and of the purpose, conditions and intent of the parties? 
The Order of 2-27-45: 
This order is short and merely needs reading to 
show the errors as to it. 
The following positive prov1s1ons conclusively dis-
prove the facts and conclusions as stated in the opinion. 
The "administrators***are authorized and directed to 
pay and distribute" to each heir, naming him, the sum 
the Court approved as "a reasonable amount***consider-
ing the properties of the decendent." Then the "balance 
***of the said estate" (R.96), after the payment of all 
debts and expenses, "shall he distributed to Virginia 
Latsis." Thus, we have a determination of heirship 
and an order of partition and distribution without any 
conditions therein at all. 
The order does not adopt any of the language of 
the petition quoted by the ·opinion here, as to the parties 
being hound upon executing documents. This language 
is ignored entirely by the Court and, on the contrary, 
something entirely different is said as to their being 
"bound," and this language also recognizes this distri-
bution as being then made, as follows: 
''It is further ORDERED that the sajd a~rrr­
ment and distribution shall be binding and con-
clusive as to each of the said four heirs upon the 
acceptance by hjm, or h~· his hPi r~ at law, of said 
payment~.'' 
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Thi~ is all. It assumes areeptance of the money, of 
eonrse, but by no means conditions the order of dis-
tribution, eyen on this, ·or at all. There is nothing more 
in the order about anybody being ''bound" and this is 
entirely different fron1 \vhat the opinion says the order 
contains. Then, and reinforcing the direct and uncon-
ditioned order ·of distribution, the Court leaves the selec-
tion of one or the other of two agencies to be used in 
forwarding the money to the attorney representatives 
of appellants, and then says that "delivery of checks 
to such source shall relieve the administrators herein 
from further responsibility therefor," i.e., for the "dis-
tribution" as ordered. 
This order is in no way attacked in this proceeding 
and it stands, and very far from leaving it up to any 
choice of accepting this distribution or electing a differ-
ent one, or from making any condition to that effect, 
the order expressly directs these heirs to furnish receipts 
and proper acknowledgments. It says, ''It is further 
ORDERED that said heirs shall furnish***a proper 
receipt," and other documents, or that their attorney 
shall procure such from them. In other words, this is 
a plain order that they must give these documents. Thus, 
there is plainly nothing conditional in this order, nor 
in the final decree. This is conclusively clear. 
If either of them are defective or erroneous, they 
hoth are made by a Court of competent and complete 
jurisdiction and are certainly not void, or subject to 
this kind of attack. 
Tlw Final Decree of 10-9-45: 
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· This solid, valid and clear decree (R. 127), backed 
hy c01nplete jurisdiction and complete orderly probate 
proceedings is here distorted and misinterpreted out 
of existence, and illegally ignored. 
All this without any pleaded attack on it or any 
pleaded claim of what the Court has decided as to it. 
First, it can be truly and directly stated that nothing 
recited in the opinion as to it approving or even referring 
to the stipulation is correct. Secondly, this decree no-
where approves the order of Feb. 27, 1945, although it 
plainly could not possibly have had any effect in making 
this decree "conditional" if it had. 
It is just as plain as it can he that the decree referred 
to this former order only to cover two matters relating 
to funds; (1) to approve the distribution as so far 
made or tendered (R. 127, par 4) and, (2) to approve 
the prior provisions whereby the widow had provided 
and deposited the funds to complete this $10,000.00 dis-
tribution (R. 127, par 6).. Thus it was that the "checks" 
were made available to the attorney representative of 
the heirs and the "sources" referred to, so as t·o relieve 
the administrators, and insure complete distribution. 
Thus paragraph 6 of the decree recites the fact of 
this deposit for this purpose. And so the decree gives 
recognition to ·the facts, (1) that a distribution pre-
viously ordered had already been partially completed, 
and, (2) that funds had been securely placed to finish 
it. 
This is exactly what this Court in Tiller v. Norton, 
253 P.2d 618 at 620, indicated should be done under 
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these circumstanePs and when the final decree was 
entered. 
And the actual paragraph of this decree quoted 
in part, and added to and changed by the opinion, didn't 
refer to the February order as something "hereinabove 
set forth," and it wasn't; and it didn't refer to that 
order as being "approved and allowed," and it wasn't. 
It would have been utterly foolish for that Court to 
be then approving and allowing an order made and 
entered seven or eight months before, and, of course, 
it didn't purport to do this. 
But plainly, what is referred to as "hereinabove set 
forth" are the "payments and distribution" already made 
and "provision for distribution" as in Paragraph 6 there-
inabove recited, and in fact it was this that the decree 
said "is approved and allowed." This was appropriate 
and proper to relieve the administrators "from further 
responsibility," so that their discharge could follow 
therein, as it did. 
The appellan1ts never alleged that this decree was 
conditional and the Court appears to recognize that 
such a final decree to be conditional must he plainly 
made so by its own terms. Otherwise no reli;1nce could 
be placed on Court decrees. 
And so the Court, following utterly misleading 
statements in respondents' briefs, appeared to think 
there was such language in this decree. There is not 
only an utter absence of any such language but the 
whole decree shows the plain intent that it would wind 
up the probate proceeding which it said "is now (R. 128) 
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1n condition to be closed." Whatever defects may be 
claimed for this final judgment its finality is certainly 
not conditioned on anything. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted, that for these reasons. 
a rehearing should he granted herein. 
Because of the numerous complica!tions involved, 
the case could not he adequately argued to the Court in 
the time available and what little was presented doubtless 
was largely lost track of before the decision. It is sug-
gested that the case should be reargued, including the 
matters above presented, so that the Court may have 
whatever help the parties may be able to contribute. 
MULLINER, PRINCE & MULLINER 
Attorneys for Respondent 
UTAH SAVINGS & TRUST COMPANY 
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